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Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug. 4, 2016)1
PROPERTY: INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Summary
This case involved the question of whether a counties’ approval of subdivision maps and
street dedications which included flood channels constituted inverse condemnation where the
plaintiff’s property flooded as a result. The Supreme Court of Nevada adopted a six part element
test for inverse condemnation, and determined that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the County’s actions constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system
sufficient to deem it public use.
Background
Appellants purchased property neighboring a creek in Washoe County, Nevada known as
White’s Creek. Prior to the Appellants purchase, Washoe County approved maps for an upstream
development, and approved maps for a separate upstream development after the Appellants
purchased the property. The County later accepted various street dedications that incorporated
drainage systems, which diverted water to Whites Creek. Since the construction of these
developments, the Appellants’ property has flooded during rainstorms.
Appellants filed for inverse condemnation against Washoe County alleging that the
County’s approval of the maps and acceptance of the drainage system dedication that diverted
water to Whites Creek, caused the flooding to their property. Appellants alleged that this conduct
constituted substantial involvement in events that caused the taking of their property. The County
sought summary judgment arguing that the Appellants lacked standing for maps it approved
prior to Appellants owning the property, and also argued that the conduct pertaining to the maps
after the purchase of the property was not substantial enough to give rise to inverse
condemnation. In opposing the motion, the Appellants attached documents detailing the
County’s involvement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County finding approval of
subdivision maps and acceptance of dedications did not amount to substantial involvement
sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation.
Discussion
Standing
The County contended that the Appellants did not have standing because the County
approved most of the subdivision maps prior to the Appellants’ purchase of the land. The
Appellants argued that their property was taken by flooding as a result of heavy rain during their
ownership. Since, takings claims lie with the party who owned the property at the time the taking
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occurred,2 and the district court’s order failed to determine when the taking occurred; the Court
concluded a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the issue of standing.
Substantial involvement
The district court found that the County did approve the maps along with certain
dedications; however the court found that this was insufficient to constitute substantial
involvement giving rise to a claim for inverse condemnation. However, the Appellants presented
evidence that the County also directed a developer to divert water north into Whites Creek.
Appellants argued that those actions cumulatively constituted substantial government
involvement in public activities, which led to an increase in the flow of water in Whites Creek
causing flooding on their property.
As the elements of inverse condemnation had not previously been set forth, the Supreme
Court of Nevada held the elements to be as follows: 1) a taking 2) of real or personal interest in
private property 3) for public use 4) without just compensation being paid 5) that is proximately
caused by a governmental entity 6) that has not instituted formal proceedings. 3 Moreover,
although a private party cannot recover in inverse condemnation for property taken by another
private party, when a private party and government entity act in concert, government
responsibility arises when the government entity was substantially involved “in the development
of private lands for public use which unreasonably injured the property of others.”4 In County of
Clark v. Powers, the government acted with various private parties to cause large amounts of
water to be cast upon the property of the plaintiff landowners.5
In arriving at its decision, the district court distinguished the present case from Powers
because unlike in Powers, the government conduct could not be described as physical
involvement directly attributable to the government entity. 6 The Supreme Court of Nevada
agreed with the district court that the facts of Powers were distinguishable from the facts of this
case. However, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that this distinction was not dispositive of
the appeal because although mere planning is insufficient to constitute substantial involvement,
the range of actions that can constitute substantial involvement are not limited to physical
engagements.
The district court also relied in part on Ullery v. Contra Costa County in addressing a
novel question of law: 7 “Whether government activities short of physical labor, but with more
engagement than mere planning, can constitute substantial involvement in a private development
sufficient to constitute public use in support of inverse condemnation.” In Ullery, the court
recognized that a public use cannot be demonstrated by mere subdivision map approval and drew
a distinction between merely approving subdivision maps and taking other actions, including
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accepting dedications. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, held that the district court
misapplied Ullery. Instead the Court distinguished Ullery from the present case, because the
Appellants alleged the County did more than merely approve subdivision maps, it also accepted
dedications and entered into agreements to direct water to certain areas. Thus, summary
judgment was improper.
Conclusion
In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that under the newly
adopted six element test, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the County’s
actions constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system sufficient to deem it public
use.8
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